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Abstract
Studies of salary determine largely model pay as i function of the attributes
ot the individual and the workplace (i.e. employer size, job characteristics, and so
forth). This paper empirically investigates an additional factor that may influence
individual pay, specifically coworker productivity. Data from the National Hockey
League are used since both salary and teammate performance measures are
readily available. We find that team attributes have both direct effects on an
individual's pay, and indirect effects by altering the rates at which individual player
productive characteristics are valued.
I. Introduction
When complementarity exists between labor inputs, individual productivity may
be poorly measured by treating the individual worker separately from the character of the
organization, or team, within which he works. Namely, the same individual may have
different measured productivity when working in different settings since his co-workers
will offer different degrees of help.1 If such complementarity between human capital
inputs is present, say a team dynamic, it will imply the existence of both team and
individual effects on productivity, and hence compensation.
Although these team effects cannot generally be captured without information on
co-workers, including managers, much of this requisite information is available in the
context of professional sports teams. As such, we use data from professional hockey to
investigate team effects on compensation (see Kahn, 1991, for a recent survey of the
literature on pay differentials in professional sports). The central goal of this paper is
therefore to empirically assess the effect of complementarities between labor inputs on
individual compensation. That is, by situating the worker in an organizational
environment where co-workers have an impact on individual productivity, we examine the
separate effects of individual and team productivity on salary determination. The general
question asked is whether or not individual attributes are valued, or rewarded, differently
in different work environments — or, in our specific case, on different teams. This study
will investigate these questions by empirically assessing the effects of co-worker
productivity, i.e. the effects of the quality (productivity) of teammates, on the
compensation of individuals on the team.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the
empirical framework used to analyze the posited team effects. Section III describes the
data used in the analysis. Section IV reports the empirical results, and Section V reports
our conclusions and directions for further work.
II. Team and Co-worker Effects
In order to empirically capture team effects on indivic ual salary we employ the
following econometric model:
infSalaryJ = ft + ft ^. + ft t_Xt + ft X{*t_Xt + ft Z, + et (1)
where X, represents a vector of individual player performances measures, t_X{ represents
the corresponding team performance measures, Z, represents additional regressors and e,
is an iid random error. The effects of an individual player's performance on his salary is
given by:
dlntfalaryJ/dXi = ft + ftfj^ (1.1)
Expression (1.1) has two components - a direct productivity effect represented by ft and
an indirect effect, ft, which measures the effect of avera£e co-worker productivity on the
rate at which individual player productivity is valued. The multiplicative specification of
the team effect captures the possibility that worker attributes will be differentially
rewarded in different work environments if the cross-partial effect, ft, is not zero.2
Thus, we have three possibilities: (1) if ft=0 then the effect of individual
attributes on productivity, or salary, are invariant to team quality, i.e. producrion is
strictly additive in its inputs, (2) if ft>0 then individual attributes are rewarded more on
good team, i.e. inputs are complementary, and (3) if &3<0 then individual attributes are
rewarded less on good teams, i.e. on higher quality teams the marginal contribution of
another unit of player quality is lower than on lesser teams, and hence is valued less.
III. Data Description
Our data are drawn from two primary sources. First, The Hockey News, (February
8, 1991), provides data supplied from the NHL Players Association on compensation.
Second, The Hockey News Complete Hockey Book (various years) provides data on
individual player performance. Our dataset contains information on 509 players for the
1990-91 season. Players are included if they played at least two years in the NHL and
twenty-six or more games in at least one year prior to the 1990-91 season, and if a salary
is reported for the player.3 All performance data are for regular season play.
One problem that arises is that some players played for more than one team in a
single year (some, in fact, played for three teams in a single season). Since salary data
was not generally available for the player for each team that he played with during the
season, comparison of multiple movers is tenuous. Nevertheless, players are considered
in our data set as members of the tram reporting his salary in a given year.
IV. Empirical Analysis
The variables that comprise the vectors X{ and t_Xt are described in Table 1 below.
Note that career performance measures for individual players use data up to and
including the year prior to the year for the dependent variable, the natural log of salary.
This is because player performance variables in the prior year determine management's
expectations about performance and hence salary. Note further that the interactions with
t_X use the same year team performance measures as salary. The idea being that current
year team values best capture the quality of a team since factors such as changes in
rosters, anticipated changes in health (e.g. a player may have been ill during the previous
season but is expected to healthy in the current season), and so forth, are best measured
with current year values,
Individual Player Variables
The expected signs for the variables that compose the vector Xt are shown in
Table 1. Following Jones and Walsh (1988), we employ a variety of variables designed to
characterize a player's skill. Skills acquired through general occupational experience are
captured by a quadratic in the number of games played over the player's career -
following the general literature on wage profiles (Mincer, 1974) an inverted U-shaped
experience effect is predicted.
The primary vari?ble representing offensive ability (ptspg) is expected to have a
positive coefficient since, all else equal, greater offensive contribution by a player
increases the likelihood that the team will win a game and thus he should be rewarded
with a greater salary.4 Similarly, star players who demonstrate unusual skill which
attracts fans should earn greater salaries, all else equal. In order to account for star
status we use a variable (altro) which is calculated for each player by adding the number
of his career all star appearances and the number of major trophies won. We expect a
positive coefficient for this variable.
The variable representing penalty minutes per game (pmpg), is expected to
capture a players intensity of play and defensive skills. As noted in Jones and Walsh
(1988), a more intense (perhaps intimidating) player demonstrates a willingness to make
the sacrifices required for the team's success. Ihis being the case, a positive coefficient is
expected.
Another variable we use to represent both a players offensive and defensive skill is
the plus-minus statistic (avgplm). The plus-minus statistic is calculated by awarding a
player a plus 1 if he is on the ice when his team scores a full-strength goal; he is
awarded a minus 1 if he is on the ice and his team gives up a full-strength goal. Career
plus-minus statistics are not calculated for players and thus a game-weighted average over
the previous three seasons is calculated for use as a proxy for a players career plus-minus
statistic. Ceteris paribus, we expect a positive coefficient for this variable.
In order to control for various physical attributes which may affect player
performance, and which are not captured by other performance variables, we include
measures for a player's height and weight. Other things equal, physically larger players
may be more effective offensively and defensively as they can use their size to gain
strategic position during play. A larger player may also be able use his size to attract and
"tie up" the play of opponents thus "freeing up" his teammates for potential scoring
opportunities. This being the case, we expect these variables to have a positive impact
on a player's salary.
To the extent that initial playing skiil is a reliable indicator of fdture performance,
players that begin their NHL career with a greater stock of ability are expected to start
their professional career with a larger salary. This initial salary differential may be
reflected later in the player's career salary path. In order to control for differences in
initial ability we have constructed a dummy variable, (dumdrft), which takes the value of
1 if a player was selected in the first or second round of the rookie draft, 0 otherwise.
As defined, we expect a positive coefficient for this variable.
In order to control for differences in compensation for player position, wt use a
dummy variable, (forward), which takes the value of 1 if a player is a forward (center or
winger), 0 otherwise. All else equal, including scoring ability, a defenseman is expected
to earn a greater salary. That is, a defenseman with the same scoring ability as a forward
would earn a higher salary because the defenseman has the added ability to prevent
opponents from scoring.5
Lastly, we include a dummy variable, (fa), which takes the value of 1 if the player
was a free agent in the year previous to current salary year. The role of this variable to
control for any performance difference the player may have demonstrated during the
season of his free agency. The logic behind this variable is that players who will become
a free agent at the end of a season may play with a greater effort and intensity than they
might otnerwise in crder to impress potential employers. Following this reasoning then,
we expect a positive coefficient for this variable.
Team Variables
As noted above, the vector t_X; contains corresponding team measures of
performance, with the individual player's contribution removed. For example, we
calculate average points per game for the team as a whole, excluding the individual
player f s points per game statistic. This provides us with an approximate measure of the
quality of players around any individual player i. Our hypothesis is that, other things
equal, an individual player's scoring ability will be greater when he plays in a team
environment that has a greater scoring ability. This being the case, we expect that the
team performance measure will have a positive effect on an individual player's salary.6
We follow the same procedure to construct team measures for the variables ptspg, pmpg,
avgplm, height, weight and altro. A positive coefficient is expected for each of these
variables.7
Included in tJCiy with no corresponding measure in Xif are performance measures
for the team's coach. This approach follows Kahn (1993) and hypothesizes that quality
coaching can enhance player performance and hence salary. Ice hockey coaches make
numerous decisions which can affect team and player performance, including composing
player lines, special team assignments and match-ups with the opposing team's player
lines.8 It is hypothesized that coaches with greater experience and coaching talent will
be able to enhance the individual player's (and team) performance by utilizing players in
such a way that maximizes the team's likelihood of winning a game. We use two
variables to control for differences in coaching quality. The first is the number of
seasons the team's coach has coached in the NHL, (coachy). It is assumed that greater
experience in coaching would lead to greater coaching ability and as such we expect a
positive sign for this variable. Second, we calculate the coach's career percentage of
points won while coaching in the NHL (coachpct). Coaches with a demonstrated ability
to coach teams to victory should have a positive effect on player performance and hence
salary. The two coaching quality variables are constructed using data for the current year
coach. Current year data is used because coaching strategy (and the resulting
effectiveness of the strategy) depends on the composition of the specific team
line-up being coached.9
Lastly, th? vector Z, contains franchise variables which are assumed to have
independent effects on player salary. In particular, total franchise revenues are included
in Z; in order to control for differences across teams in their available funds that can be
used to compensate players. As with the coaching variables, current revenues are used
since they should best represent management's expected revenues generated by a team's
current composition. We expect that greater revenues should be associated with greater
player salaries, all else equal.
Estimation Results
Table 2 reports salary regressions for specifications with and without team
variables. Player salaries are first regressed on measures of their own-productivity, X{.
We then add team measures, first coaching quality, and then the average productivity of
co-workers (i.e., teammates), tJC{. If the coefficients on own-productivity fall when team
measures are added, then we interpret this result as indicating that part of the measured
effect of player characteristics on their salary is due to other players', or team,
contributions to their productivity10. Further, if other player's productivity affects the
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wages of the individual player directly, namely not through the route of increasing the
individual player's productivity per se, then this may be because the manager realizes that
other player productivity is partly due to the contributions of the individual player in
question.11 Finally, we next include interactions of individual attributes and
corresponding team averages in order to evaluate whether or not co-worker productivity
affects the valuation of individual attributes.12
Looking now at the basic specification in column (1) we see that all of the
regressors have the expected signs and each is statistically significant, wi*h the exception
of player weight and dumdrft - results consistent with other studies (see, for example,
Jones and Walsh (1987, 1988); Lavoie, et al., 1987, 1992; Mclean and Veall, 1992.). In
column (2) we add the first set of team variables, namely franchise revenue (totrev) and
proxies for coaching quality (coachy, coachpct). Surprisingly, while totrev has the
expected positive effect on player salaries, it is only marginally significant (at the 11%
level).13 Coaching quality, though, is seen to have a significant effect on player salaries.
Comparing changes in the magnitude of the player attribute effects, we see that there is
little change in most of the coefficients with the exception of a 28% dcline in the effect
of (avgplm). Apparently the effect of (avgplm) is upwardly biased when coaching quality
is not included in the regressions. As noted above, this is consistent with the positive
coaching effects on salary, and a positive effect of coaching quality on player plus-minus
statistics.
Specification (3) additionally includes a second vector of team variables that
measure the average playing quality of teammates. As with the comparison between
specifications (1) and (2), we see that inclusion of team averages produces little change
in the direct effects of player attributes on their salaries, though (fa) does decline
somewhat and declines from 1% to 5% in significance. Nevertheless, while most of the
direct team effect variables are individually insignificant, they do achieve joint
significance at the 13% level. Furthermore, while the coaching variables remain jointly
significant at the 5% level, the individual effect of coachpct becomes insignificant -
possibly this is b ocause the positive effect of coaching ability on individual player salaries
operates through assembling a certain quality team (see Porter and Scully, 1983; Clement
and McCormick, 1989; Chapman and Southwick, 1991; Kahn, 1993).14
Finally, specification (4) allows the productivity attributes of players to have
differential effects on player salaries based on the quality of their teammates. As seen
from the joint significance tests, allowing the effect of team values to vary across the
characteristics of the players raises the joint significance of the direct team effects from
15% to 5% significance. Furthermore, the vector of interactions achieve joint
significance at the iO% level, indicating that taken as a whole, individual player attributes
are different*'ally valued based on the productivity attributes of teammates. Inclusion of
the interactions, though, does produce rather pronounced collinearity problems with
certain variables, particularly (pmpg), (height), and (weight), as evidenced by more than
10-fold increase in standard errors. As a result, inferences about these individual
estimated effects becomes tenuous.15
Nevertheless, while the interactions are mostly individually insignificant, we see
that ihey tend to have a negative effect. If we take these negative coefficients as
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meaningful, (i.e. different from zero), then this would mean that individual player
productivity is rewarded at a lower rate on teams with better players, i.e. labor inputs
appear to be weakly gross substitutes rather than complements.16 What this might be
reflecting is diminishing returns to quality across a given team, so that if teammates are
of higher quality then the management views additional units of quality as relatively less
valuable for the team and according will pay relatively less for such additional value. In
other words, if the team already has some great scorers, then the value to the team of an
additional first-rate scorer is less than if the team were lacking in scorers.17
To the extent that the generally negative pattern in the interactions is being
caused by the above possibility, it raises the question of just to what extent these results
generalize to industrial settings, especially relatively large firms. An industrial setting
that is perhaps closest to NHL teams might be a small firm that has, say two high quality
engineers and thus feels that there will be relatively little gained by investing in another
first-rate engineer - similar considerations might apply within divisions of larger firms or
for certain positions near the top of a managerial hierarchy. Yet in larger firms were
larger teams are assembled at different points in the production process, greater returns
to complementarity in talent may be present as redundancy in skills become less
important (see Kremer, 1993). As such, there may be distinct differences in the effects




This paper has investigated the general question of the effects of co-worker
attributes on the compensation of individuals in an organization. Our specific empirical
focus has been on professional hockey because data is available for both players and
coaches, thereby allowing for the construction of a partial vector of management
productivity and co-worker productivity variables. Our central findings are that team
attributes have both direct effects on individual player compensation and indirect effects
through altering the rates at which individual player productive characteristics are
valued.19
Although the effects are neither uniform nor of large magnitude, when team
variables are incorporated into the regressions there occurs a decline in certain individual
productivity effects. This result indicates that estimates of the effects of individual
attributes on compensation are somewhat upwardly biased when team effects are not
taken into account in standard salary regressions. Furthermore, it appears that on
average, players seem to be weakly gross substitutes in the production process in
professional hockey. This latter result is somewhat at variance with our priors that labor
inputs will tend to be complementary factors, though it might be that certain
combinations of positions are gross complements, and that positive interactions might
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I. Individual player variables
games Total number of games played over
the player's NHL career
ptspg Career points per game (goals and
assists)
pmpg Career penalty minutes per game
avgplm Game-weighted average plus-minus
statistic
height Players' height (in inches)
weight Players' weight (in pounds)
altro The number of times the player was
selected as an all star plus the
number of NHL trophies he has won
dumdrft = 1 if the player was selected in the
first or second draft round, 0 otherwise
forward = 1 if the player is a forward,
0 otherwise
fa = 1 if the player was a free agent prior






















totrev The total team revenues
coachy The number of seasons the team's
coach has coached in the NHL








a. The salary data are for the 1990-91 season and were obtained from The Hockey News (February 8, 1991,
p.46-47); mean (std. dev.) of player salaries are 232,098 (200,139). Performance data for players and
coaches were taken from The Sporting News Complete Hockey Book, various years. Data on team revenues
was obtained from Financial World, (Jury, 1992). Information on free agents was obtained from the NHL.
b. In the NHL a win is worth 2 points, a tie one point and a loss 0 points. The variable coachpct is
calculated for each coach as the percent of points won out of total points possible, over the coach's career.
Table 2: Salary Regressions
Dependent Variable = log (salary), n=509
Variable (1)





























































































































Table 2: Salary Regressions* (cont.)
Dependent Variable = log (salary), n=509
Variable
3. Team Averages










t_avgplm x avgplm xlO3
t_height x height



























































Notes: Parameter estimates (OLS) are reported with standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1%,
5%, 10% and 15% levels are denoted by superscripts a,b,c, and d. F-statl tests for the joint significance of
the two coach variables; F-stat2 tests for the joint significance of the team averages for ptspg through altro;
F-stat3 tests for the joint significance of the interactions of the team averages and the player values.
Endnotes
1. This argument is similar to the effects of complementarity of physical capital with
human capital (see Griliches, 1969).
2. Team effects on compensation will not only operate through altering the rates at which
productivity related attributes are rewarded, but also directly through the $L term.
Furthermore, if /S2 5^  0 and cov(t_Xi, Xj);*0 then failure to include t__Xj in the regressions
will bias the estimate of ftv
3. This follows the methodology in Jones and Walsh (1988). Rookie players (less than
two years experience in the NHL) are excluded since they have no career data. Further,
players that have not played at least 26 games in at least one NHL season are excluded
since they do not qualify as full-time players. Goalies are also excluded from the
analysis. This is because the statistics describing a goalie's performance are not
comparable to that used for non-goalies.
4. In addition to improving a teams winning ability, skilled offensive players may also
cause an increase in attendance by fans who wish to view skilled play, regardless of the
outcome of the game.
5. Examples of defensemen with great scoring ability would include Paul Coffey
(Detroit), Ray Bourque (Boston), Brian Leetch (N.Y. Rangers). Arguably the greatest
offensive defenseman ever was Bobby Orr (Boston) who twice won the Art Ross trophy
for leading scorer among all players in the league (1969-70 and 1974-75 seasons). In
principal, all (non-goalie) players are responsible for both offensive and defensive play.
Forwards, however, have the primary task of scoring goals, while the primary role of
defensemen is to prevent opponents from scoring.
6. As an example of how individual performance is 'inked to the performance of
teammates, we can consider Bernie Nicholls during nis play with the Los Angeles Kings
before and after the trade of Wayne Gretzky. In 1988 Wayne Gretzky, arguably the
most talented hockey player in history, was traded by Edmonton to the Los Angeles
Kings. He played together with Bernie Nicholls during the 1988-89 season in L.A. and
Nicholls had a career high 150 points, 50 points more than he had scored in any of his
previous 6 seasons in the NHL, with nearly 2 points per game. Nicholls was traded mid-
way through the 1989-90 season to the New York Rangers and his scoring dropped
significantly. During the 1990-91 season with the Rangers Nicholls scored 73 points and
his points per game dropped to approximately 1. One can think of examples from other
sports as well. For example we can consider the impact that Magic Johnson had on the
scoring ability of James Worthy when they played together in the NBA for the Los
Angeles Lakers.As an example of how individual performance is linked to the
performance of teammates, we can consider Bernie Nicholls during his play with the Los
Angeles Kings before and after the trade of Wayne Gretzky. In 1988 Wayne Gretzky,
arguably the most talented hockey player in history, was traded by Edmonton to the Los
Angeles Kings. He played together with Bernie Nicholls during the 1988-89 season in
L.A. and Nicholls had a career high 150 points, 50 points more than he had scored in
any of his previous 6 seasons in the NHL, with nearly 2 points per game. Nicholls was
traded mid-way through the 1989-90 season to the New York Rangers and his scoring
dropped significantly. During the 1990-91 season with the Rangers Nicholls scored 73
points and his points per game dropped to approximately 1. One can think of examples
from other sports as well. For example we can consider the impact that Magic Johnson
had on the scoring ability of James Worthy when they played together in the NBA for
the Los Angeles Lakers.
7. This, of course, assumes players are complementary "inputs", i.e. possibility (2) noted
above.
8. A player "line" consists of a set of three players (a center and two wings) which play
together. In addition, defensemen typically play in pairs which are determined Dy the
coach.
9. Prior-year data would obscure the coaching effect since roster changes, (due to trades
or injuries), would imply a different team composition.
10. If <32>0 and cov(t_Xj, Xj)>0 then omission of t_Xj will upwardly bias the estimate of
18,.
11. Note that we cannot run own-productivity as a function of team mates productivity
and simply interpret a positive coefficient as complementarity in labor inputs. This is
because any observed relationship might reflect sorting, where most productive players
gravitate to other more productive players.
12. Ideally we would like to measure the individual's productivity as an individual specific
output plus the contributions of the individual to productivity of other players on the
team, minus the contribution of other players on the team to the output of the
individual. Namely, some players may produce high yields in terms of helping other
players in ways that traditional productivity measures do not capture, leading to an
underestimate of their productivity to the statistician, but this may be known to the team
and accordingly compensated (s>o that the player may look like he is overpaid). Similarly,
some players may have inflated measured productivity statistics since much of his
"output" is due to the contributions of other players and little is contributed to them (e.g.
the player get lots of shots due to being setup by other players in ways that are too
general to be counted as assists), so that to the statistician he might look like he is
underpaid. Data limitations, though, preclude identifying each of these separate effects
for our NHL files.
13. Although chis result is unexpected, it might be due to teams with higher revenues
investing their funds in higher quality coaching staffs (and other support personnel),
better training facilities, and so forth , all of which would then be captured by the coach
and player productivity variables. Data limitations, though, preclude a direct assesment
of this possibility.
14. We additionally evaluated team-level effects on own-productivity and salary by
estimating a "multilevel" model (see Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992), which allows for a
decomposition of the total variance of the dependent variable into the components that
occur at the indivudal player level and at the team level. Although program parameters
(we used the program ML3; see Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992) limit the number of team-
level effects that can be estimated, we did estimate a multilevel model version of the
specification in column (1) in Table 2 that allows for a team-level variance for points per
game (ptspg) as an explanatory variable. A test of significance for the inclusion of team-
level variance in "ptspg" passed at better than the 1% significance level, supporting our
main hypothesis that team effects are important in explaining individual performance and
salary (results available upon request).
15. Note, though, that v hile collinearity will tend to increase standard errors, and
possibly cause counterintuitive sign changes in coefficients as occurs for the variable
weight, it will not interfere with joint hypothesis tests.
16. Of course, if we take these coefficients as truly being zero, then the interpretation is
that player value is invariant to the quality of the other players on the team.Of course, if
we take these coefficients as truly being zero, then the interpretation is that player value
is invariant to the quality of the other players on the team.
17. Other potentially important interaction effects were tested. For example, when a
team is composed management may be willing to pay a premium for players who can fill
particular gaps in their line-up. Thus a team with, say, a pool of talented scorers might
desire to hire a player who can act as an "enforcer" or "intimidator" to complete the line-
up. To test for this effect, an interaction between team points per game (t_ptspg) and
penalty minutes per game (pmpg) was tested. This effect, however, was not statistically
significant and was consequently dropped from the model.
18. See Idson (1995) for an empiric? 1 analysis of the relationship between team size, firm
size, and compensation See Tdson (1995) for an empirical analysis of the relationship
between team size, iirm size, and compensation.
19. It should also be pointed out that our basic model incorporates two statistically
important variables, free agent status (fa) and the plus-minus statistic (avgplm), which, to
our knowledge, are not included in previous research on pay and performance in the
NHL. As such, our basic model represents an improvement on the existing literature.
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